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In the fi rst part of the paper, Gaus’ ground for 
the ideal of persons as free and equal is described. 
Doubts are raised about the appropriateness of the 
use of his account of this ideal as endogenous to 
our moral practice. Th e worries are related to the 
use of the concept of having a reason that Gaus 
makes in his book, as well as to the aptness of his 
account of our moral practice from the viewpoint 
of our moral phenomenology. Some doubts 
are raised in relation to the pertinence of Gaus’ 
concept of having a reason from the perspective of 
the motivation of the public reason project. 
In the second part of the paper, a summary is 
off ered of Gaus’ model of public justifi cation 
and some of its consequences are discussed. Th e 
primary intention here is to show that, contrary to 
Gaus’ view, egalitarian liberalism, and not classical 
liberalism, is the most appropriate result of such a 
model of justifi cation.
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Gerald Gaus’ Th e Order of Public Reason 
is a monumental work and a masterpiece 
of moral and political philosophy. It is an 
enormous pleasure and a privilege to have 
the possibility to discuss it with the author. 
As is usual in philosophical discussions, 
I will remark the points that raise some 
doubts to me. 
At the beginning of the paper, I describe 
Gaus’ ground for the ideal of persons 
as free and equal. I raise some doubts 
about the appropriateness of the use of 
his account of this ideal as endogenous 
to our moral practice. Th e worries are 
related to the use of the concept of having 
a reason that Gaus makes in his book, as 
well as to the aptness of his account of 
our moral practice from the viewpoint of 
our moral phenomenology. Some doubts 
are raised in relation to the pertinence of 
Gaus’ concept of having a reason from the 
perspective of the motivation of the public 
reason project. 
In the second part of the paper, I off er 
a summary of Gaus’ model of public 
justifi cation and I discuss some of its 
consequences. My primary intention here 
is to show that, contrary to Gaus’ view, 
egalitarian liberalism, and not classical 
liberalism, is the most appropriate result 
of such a model of justifi cation. 
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1.1. 
Th e pivotal moment in Gaus’ book is represented by the statement that the acceptance 
of others as free and equal is an endogenous commitment of our morality (Gaus 2011, 
223). In other words, this is not a commitment that derives from a controversial 
philosophical argument or a sectarian viewpoint. We are committed to it simply by the 
moral practice in which we are engaged. How does Gaus show this? 
Gaus says that, although morality performs a function, an account based merely on 
instrumental rationality is not suffi  cient to explain it (Gaus 2011, 53-258). Morality 
must be explained together with the explanation of our caring for a moral rule even 
when it does not promote our wants, ends, or goals. Caring for a moral rule includes 
punishing others, when they disrespect it. Central for the explanation of this caring 
are reactive moral emotions, i.e. resentment, indignation and blame, emotions that we 
express to others when they do not respond to moral requirements, as well as guilt, 
which we feel when we do not respond to moral requirements. Th is is the fi rst step 
of Gaus’ argument: (i) endorsing a moral requirement implies endorsing emotional 
reactive attitudes toward the disrespecting of it (blame, indignation, etc.). 
We appropriately have a reactive moral emotion toward a person who does not respond 
to a moral requirement only if the moral prescription is appropriately addressed to her. 
Gaus explains this with (ii) “Th e Principle of Moral Autonomy. A moral prescription is 
appropriately addressed to Betty only if she is capable of caring for a moral rule even 
when it does not promote her wants, ends, or goals and she has suffi  cient reasons to 
endorse the relevant rule” (Gaus 2011, 222). Th is principle represents the second step 
in Gaus’ argument. Th is is the main ground for the acceptance of others as free and 
equal as an endogenous commitment of our morality. It is important to remark what 
is exactly a free and moral person for Gaus: “She is a free moral person as she can be 
guided by her own sense of obligation based on her own reasons; she is equal because 
her reasons are as defi nitive about what she can recognize as her obligations as mine are 
about what I can see as mine” (Gaus 2011, 223). An important part of Gaus’ argument 
is represented by (iii) having a reason is defi ned internalistically.
Th e central notion of a free and equal person does not commit Gaus to a substantial 
interpretation of equality, i.e. to a form of egalitarian liberalism. On the contrary, 
he defends a form of small state classical liberalism. I will try to show that the 
commitments of public justifi cation are more properly related to a support to some 
forms of egalitarian liberalism. But before this, I discuss the crucial steps of Gaus’ 
argument shown until now. 
Gaus takes (i) as a fact of our moral practice. (ii) and its link to the ideal of free and 
equal persons is related to the acceptance of (i). Namely, it is not part of our moral 
practices to address moral reactive emotions to people who are unable to interiorize 
moral requirements, or do not have suffi  cient reasons to do so. 
But (ii) is related to (iii) — having a reason is interpreted internalistically, as well. 
Precisely the thesis of (iii) is that one has a reason when she has a reason accessible to 
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her under respectable reasoning. Th e internalistic conception of having a reason is one 
of the foundations of the ideal of persons as free and equal.
It is important to remark that a person does not have a reason in the sense that the 
reason that she has is the reason that, in a particular moment, she thinks that she has, 
or that she accepts as her reason. A person does not have a reason if there is a defeater 
easily accessible to her for what she takes as her reason. A person does not have a 
suffi  cient reason even if she takes in consideration the defeater and reacts properly, 
but neglects an equally accessible defeater of the defeater, or a slightly more diffi  cultly 
accessible defeater of the defeater. But where can a person legitimately stop? Th e 
danger is that we collapse in the requirements of full rationality. In order to avoid 
this, Gaus establishes the criterion of respectable amount of reasoning in our morality 
as the reasoning of a normal conscientious person. Th ere are people more engaged 
in moral reasoning. Th ey are engaged in more than respectable reasoning. Because 
of the fact that moral reasoning is a social activity, they can transmit their higher 
achievements to other people, who do not need to be able to reproduce their steps in 
reasoning. Sometimes the most other people can achieve is to have reasons to trust 
them. So, a person can have suffi  cient reasons because she has been engaged in more 
than respectable reasoning, or because she profi ts from those that have been engaged 
in more than respectable reasoning, or because she has been engaged in respectable 
reasoning. To be sure, there is no absolute obligation for a person to endorse the results 
of the reasoning of experts. It is reasonable for a person to endorse this only if she has 
reasons to trust them. Generally, says Gaus, there is no problem here, because epistemic 
practices in general function as social enterprises, with a proper role for experts. 
1.2. 
Th e account that Gaus off ers does not correspond to a refl ection on our moral 
practice, but to a controversial philosophical position, if, among other, it includes an 
ambiguous1 or contested conception of having a reason, because this conception plays 
a crucial role in the account. Another possible reason to worry about Gaus’ intention 
to off er a refl ection on our moral practice, as opposed to a controversial philosophical 
position, appears if the refl ection does not correspond to our moral phenomenology. 
I will indicate some doubts related to both points. Before proceeding, I remark that 
for Gaus it is of crucial importance to establish the ideal of free and equal persons and 
its consequence for the justifi cation of social morality as endogenous to our moral 
practice, in order to avoid the charge of sectarianism.2
One of the issues with Gaus’ conception of having a reason is that it is related to a 
questionable level of idealization. As we have already seen, a person does not have 
suffi  cient reason if there is a defeater for the reason available to the person after a 
respectable amount of reasoning. Recall that Gaus can make a use of this epistemic 
view of having a reason that leads to sensible departures from the reasons that people 
1  Enoch directs to Gaus the charge of equivocation (Enoch forthcoming, section Having a Reason (and 
How Gaus Gives Away the Game When It Comes to Absolute Morality)).
2  David Enoch directs to Gaus, as well as to the whole public reason project, the charge of sectarian-
ism (Enoch forthcoming, sections Self-Defeat and A Concluding Th ought about the False Modesty of Public 
Reason). 
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actually endorse. For example, there may be the case of Alf who, in virtue of a neurosis, 
does not verify a possible defeater of the reason that she endorses. Idealized Alf, 
nonetheless, takes in consideration this defeater and, as a consequence, the reason 
endorsed by the real world Alf is not a reason that he has. As Gaus says, “if idealized 
Alf examined Alf ’s presently affi  rmed set of reasons and concludes that some of these 
are bad reasons (say, his reliance on political ideology to decide what philosophical 
doctrines to accept), then actual Alf does not have the reasons he affi  rms because they 
would not be affi  rmed by idealized Alf ” (Gaus 2011, 237). But in general, Gaus is 
ready to support the authority of actual people to affi  rm the reasons that they take as 
their reasons (Gaus 1996, 150-151). Moreover, this is what constitutes the essence of 
liberalism, contrary to sectarianism (Gaus 2012). But now the worry appears that it is 
not clear what can be the appropriate level of idealization. It may be possible to say that 
by admitting some level of idealization, Gaus opens the door “to further idealization, 
which may result in imputing beliefs and epistemic practices to them they do not have, 
which they may not recognize, and which could not therefore explain their beliefs and 
actions. […] Someone […] could get a Ph.D. in political theory and believe whatever 
it is that any particular theorist believes or read all the books his interlocutors have. He 
could come to see his beliefs in God or the free market or a socialist society as childish 
fantasy if given suffi  cient time and exposure to cogent arguments. If this is the terrain 
of the debate, then the point of the recourse to internalism, to tie moral and political 
justifi cation to actual people, is largely lost. Rather, theorists should just argue about 
what people ought to believe by showing what reasons there are” (Moon 2011). 
Th ere are philosophers who avoid this problem, because their thesis is that the right level 
of idealization is that of full rationality, and for them this idea is related to externalism 
about reasons. Such is the position of Stephen Wall (Wall 2010, 133-136), for whom 
full rationality means, among else, “awareness and appreciation of the full range of 
evaluative considerations that apply to the situation at hand” (Wall 2010, 134). Th e 
externalist idea of full rationality is endorsed by Richard Arneson, as well: “If I am 
below the threshold acceptable level, then when you impose on me on the basis of 
moral principles I do not accept, the thing to say to me is that you are not treating me 
wrongly or disrespectfully. You are treating me according to principles I would accept 
if I were fully rational. But this is the correct response to anyone who is less than fully 
reasonable and rational. […] Reasonable and rational people when fully informed will 
not disagree” (Arneson 2011).
One of the main grounds for the philosophical refusal of the idea of full rationality 
endorsed by these authors is that it is not practicable because even agents with 
magnifi cent epistemic capacities will not converge on the same beliefs. For convergence 
it is required that “either (i) they initially believe precisely the same things and had 
precisely the same values, ends, goals, and so on, or (ii) what they initially believed had 
no eff ect on their fi nal set of beliefs” (Gaus 2011, 239). Th e fi rst possibility is hardly 
possible. As concerns the second possibility, Gaus says that convergence is not to be 
expected, because since every person starts from where she is, her initial beliefs have 
a privileged position. Th ese beliefs, for every agent, infl uence the content of the set 
of beliefs justifi ed in every further step. Moreover, it is also relevant that every agent 
will shape diff erent coherent sets of beliefs depending on when they start their belief 
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revisions: “depending on the order in which the choice is made, full rationality may 
lead to a variety of outcomes” (Gaus 2011, 243). 
My worry is about whether we have here a not controversial epistemology. One of 
the possible replies consists in socializing epistemology, as has been done in some 
epistemological proposals of high reputation. I think about cases when persons interact 
and, therefore, infl uence each other, which can favor convergence. Keith Lehrer, for 
example, has shown that convergence is possible if interaction is suffi  ciently iterated and 
if persons attribute to each other a reliability higher than 0 (Lehrer and Wagner 1981). 
A diff erent strategy is indicated by Philip Kitcher. Convergence, in his view, is possible 
because of the infl uence of the growth of evidence. In his opinion, scientifi c theories 
depend on values that we endorse, not only epistemic values, but moral and other 
values, as well. As a consequence, the endorsement of a scientifi c theory is infl uenced 
by, for example, the endorsement of a religious theory. It may appear that such a 
view strongly supports the denial of the possibility of convergence. But the growth 
of evidence can show that the only reason to refuse a scientifi c theory may be the 
protection of the religious theory. In such a case, the increase of evidence pushes for the 
revision of the religious doctrine (or any other system of beliefs from which one starts) 
and important steps are made in the direction of convergence (Kitcher 2011). Finally, 
I indicate the example of an epistemologist who remarks the importance of formative 
experience. Michael DePaul says that looking for coherence, with the strategy of saving 
the most of initial beliefs, is only one of the possible epistemological strategies. Radical 
revisions are possible as well. In particular, such radical revisions are welcome if they 
are the result of formative experience, of the refi nement of the capacity to form beliefs 
or judgments. Obviously, there is no guarantee that convergence will be obtained, 
but it can be obtained despite the fact that diff erent persons start from diff erent sets 
of beliefs, if they have enough common experiences (DePaul 1993). In any case, in 
DePaul’s proposal, the initial set of beliefs does not have such a decisive role, like in 
Gaus’ view. My claim is not that these proposals are the best epistemological proposals, 
but that they appear as intelligible and reasonable proposals that support the idea of 
convergence. Perhaps they are not in the same strand of the idea of full rationality seen 
above, but they are supports to the idea of external reasons and growing of convergence, 
at least in contrast to Gaus’ view that appeals to the crucial role of initial beliefs. 
A version of externalism that does not employ the idea of full rationality appears to 
be that of Mack. Even if the epistemological proposals that I have indicated were 
unable to support the full rationality view, they may be a good support to Mack’s more 
moderate view. As he says, “Why does Gaus think that expressing to Betty a reason 
for Betty to desist is merely talking at Betty and not to her? I think the answer is that 
Gaus does not think that anyone can ever be given (presented with) a reason. Or more 
precisely, a person cannot be given (or presented with) a reason she does not already 
have. Betty cannot be given a reason in the sense of having her attention drawn to a 
consideration on behalf of or against an action that is not already among her evaluative 
considerations. […] My contrary view is that people can be presented with reasons 
which are not already residing within their evaluative considerations; contrary to Gaus, 
deliberation includes judging whether to bring into one’s motivational structure a 
consideration which is not already there. […] Th at is why I see presenting Betty with 
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a reason for her desisting—which reason she does not at that point have (in Gaus’ 
sense)—as an instance of addressing her and not merely talking at her.” (Mack 2011).
Gaus can off er answers to both lines, the full rationality, as well as the more moderate 
view of Mack. As he could say, there is nothing bad in trying to improve the reasons 
people have, in order to try to obtain convergence on more developed reasons. But 
everything that he says about illegitimacy of coercion still remains in the cases that persist 
in resisting convergence and as far as they do so. Still, a problem of instability persists 
for Gaus in virtue of his concept of having a reason that admits some idealization. It 
is still unclear how much reasoning can we demand in order to recognize that one has 
satisfi ed the requirement of respectable reasoning.
A kind of challenge directed to Gaus is that the idealization that he introduces is the 
source of authoritarianism. It is exactly avoiding authoritarianism that Gaus sees as 
one of the main advantages of his proposal. As he says, it is one thing to say that one’s 
reasons are those that best fi t with what else she believes, and she would recognize 
these reasons after respectable reasoning (which is the level of idealization supported 
by Gaus), but still another thing to arrive at the level of epistemic perfection required 
by the external reasons view. It is only the latter requirement that is authoritarian. But 
when one (Betty) says to another one (Alf ) that he would realize that he has a reason 
because he would realize this if he considered a defeater accessible to him, isn’t this a 
form of authoritarianism? Isn’t Betty imposing her view to Alf? Gaus answers to this 
problem: “When another demands that you comply with a rule she is demanding that 
you do what you have suffi  cient reasons to do; she is appealing to your rational nature, 
not demanding that you put it aside. She must be saying: “you have reasons to comply 
that you are ignoring. My demand is not simply that you live as I see fi t, but as you 
would see fi t if you adequately employed your reason”” (Gaus 2011, 263). So, Gaus 
would say, it is a diff erent case if Betty says to Alf “You must do φ because this is the 
right thing to do!” or if she says “You must do φ because this is the right thing to do 
as it follows from your evaluative standard Σ!”. But what if Alf refuses this? It is quite 
a natural reaction of some communities (for example, religious) to feel insulted exactly 
because external people want to impose on them conclusions about what follows from 
their evaluative standards. At the end of the day, Enoch says, the insult is that of not 
having dedicated respectable reasoning to what a person herself takes as of being of 
value (Enoch forthcoming, section Idealizing, and Excluding the Unreasonable).
On the same line, although with less vehemence, it may appear that the level of 
idealization that Gaus introduces can be a ground to charge his proposal of being 
an unlikely public justifi cation theory, if the core intention of public justifi cation is 
to reconcile the exercise of liberal authority with the citizens’ will, which is obtained 
by establishing principles on which citizens must be able to voluntarily act. In virtue 
of the epistemic gap between epistemically idealized agents and real agents that Gaus 
establishes, constituted by his account based on accessible and not actual reasons, his 
proposal is devoid of voluntarism and takes the side of correctness-based account of 
justifi cation. Namely, it is to be expected that an agent can be unable to voluntarily act 
on a reason that he does not actually embrace, although the reason may be accessible 
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to her after more reasoning.3
Th e objections of authoritarianism, as well as that of de-voluntarisation, depend on the 
issue of Betty’s epistemic authority over Alf. Here it must be said that Gaus is cautious. 
As he says, in order to override Alf ’s epistemic authority over the reasons that he has, 
Betty must have a particularly strong case. Precisely, she must base her claim beyond 
a reasonable doubt (Gaus 1996, 150-151). But this is rather improbable on every 
interesting moral matter. As Gaus says, “because matters are so complex, neither side 
can typically claim victory” (Gaus 1996, 154). Th is is exactly the original teaching of 
burdens of judgment.
Th e question, now, is whether for Gaus it would be better to renounce the epistemic 
idealization, after all. Th e motivation for idealization is related to the avoidance of 
what Gaus defi nes as Populist Th eory of Justifi cation instantiated by the Actual Assent 
Th esis. According to this thesis, Betty can impose a demand on Alf only if she obtains 
his assent. Gaus dismisses this thesis: “People can withhold their assent because of 
obstinacy, selfi shness, laziness, perversity, or confusion” (Gaus 1996, 131).
Gaus discusses a less populist version of Justifi catory Populism that admits that 
sometimes Betty’s demand is justifi ed even if Alf dissents. Th e requirement is that Alf 
deliberates in good faith and doing his best to reason. Th is is called Reasonable People 
Th esis. Th e core aspect of the thesis that Gaus discusses is that reasonable people rely 
only on methods of reasoning that are accessible to others, precisely on commonsense 
reasoning and conclusions of science when they are not controversial. However, as 
Gaus remarks, commonsense reasoning includes a lot of fallacies and heuristics, and 
therefore leads to normatively inappropriate results. Gaus’ alternative is to appeal to 
a minimalist theory of reasoning, by which we can identify the reasons of people as 
reasons to which they are committed by their own system of beliefs and reasons (Gaus 
1996, 130-136).
With this, however, we may appear to be back to the charges of anti-voluntarism and 
of authoritarianism. But don’t forget that Gaus says that each agent has an almost 
absolute authority over her reasons. Only in exceptional cases can Alf and Betty claim 
epistemic authority over each other. Are we, by this, back to something very close to 
the Actual Assent Th esis?
Th is would not seem to me as a bad result. After all, as we will see in the next parts of 
the paper, Th e Order of Public Reason has powerful resources to exclude some personal 
demands from public justifi cation. Other agents can exclude from the eligible set of 
rules Alf ’s proposal of rule if it is ineligible for them. Th ey must be careful in doing 
so, because this would imply that they do not have a moral relation with him, which 
means that they cannot direct authoritative moral requirements to him. But they have 
blameless liberty toward him. So, there is a price for Alf, as well. Th is is the reason 
why Alf must be very careful when he insists with requirements that are ineligible for 
3  Th e objection is inspired by Enzo Rossi (Rossi forthcoming). Th e diff erence between Rossi's formula-
tion and the one that I off er here is represented by the fact that he affi  rms the voluntaristic problem as 
related to an agent who is unable to accept a reason even despite seeing that it is a reason for her.
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others.
At the end of the day, it may appear that it is not worth it to employ energy to establish 
when a person is reasonable in relation to her reasons. Instead it is more worth-deserving 
to try to defi ne her reasonableness in her interaction with others. Perhaps this is not 
a welcome outcome for Gaus, because it pushes in the direction of public reason as 
related to the Rawlsian idea focused on reciprocity between free and equal agents, as 
opposed to what may be Gaus’ conception of autonomy focused on reasonableness in 
relation to subjects’ reasons (cfr. Rossi forthcoming; Quong forthcoming).
At the really end of this part of the discussion, it appears the issue about whether 
sometimes it is not possible to avoid forms of strong externalism. I refer, for example, 
to the case of religious parents who refuse medical support for their child and let her 
die. According to the selection for the eligible set of moral rules (that I explain below), 
some parents can prefer no social regulation at all of parents’ duties and of the limits of 
their rights toward children than a regulation that limits parents’ religious or cultural 
freedom in these matters. But, even for many liberals this is totally unacceptable. J.S. 
Mill, as he shows in the fi fth chapter of On Liberty, is a prominent example (Mill 
1859/1977, 301-304). It seems to me that there is an interesting question for Gaus 
about the issue of parents’ rights and duties toward their children. Whose freedom 
must be protected? Th e freedom of parents? Th e freedom of civil servants? Do interests 
of children prevail? But who establishes what the interests of children are? Th e issue 
here is about who has the jurisdictional right in the education of children.4
1.3. 
I go now to a further challenge that may be directed to Gaus’ discussion intended to 
found freedom and equality on the base of a refl ection on our moral practice. Th is 
refl ection, as Gaus says, reveals that we direct reactive emotions only to agents that 
have a suffi  cient reason for endorsing a moral prescription, while ‘having a reason’ 
is intended as ‘having a reason accessible to the agent’ — otherwise, a reactive moral 
emotion is not appropriate. 
It seems implausible to take Gaus’ internalism as a credible account of our moral 
practice if it importantly diverges from our moral phenomenology. Certainly, there are 
relevant counterexamples to strong externalism coming from moral phenomenology. 
It is implausible to blame a person who lived in Athens in the fi fth century BC for 
accepting slave ownership. But there appear to be counterexamples to Gaus’ account, 
as well. Certainly we blame and feel indignation for Goebbels, although it does not 
appear how our moral reasons could possibly enter in his evaluative standards. We 
blame and feel indignation for his wife for having killed their children, although this 
may perfectly follow from her evaluative standards. I am tempted to say that we blame 
religious parents who withhold medical treatment and let their child die because she 
did not receive medical support. Th is situation may be dubious. In a famous case, there 
was a diff erence between the attitude toward the father (who had no doubts about 
the right option to take in this situation) and the mother who had some doubts. Th is 
4  I thank Ivan Cerovac for the discussion of his point.
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seems to confi rm Gaus’ view that blame is directed only to the person for whom it was 
possible to access a moral reason (in this case, the suffi  cient reason to off er medical 
support to the child). But endorsing such a criterion opens the door to some surprising 
results. For example, we would have to direct more blame and feel stronger indignation 
for Eichmann (who declared that he had some awareness of the monstrosity of Nazism; 
or at least it appears that such awareness was available to him) than for Goebbels 
(who was totally convinced in any single moment about the Nazi project). We would 
have to feel stronger blame, indignation and resentment for a neo-Nazi who beats 
members of ethnic or racial minorities in his suburb, than for Goebbels.5 Th is appears 
so strongly counterintuitive and distant from our moral phenomenology that it needs 
to be explained. 
It seems that we have various reactive attitudes in relation to diff erent types of cases. 
On one hand, there is the absence of reactive attitudes in relation to subjects who 
cannot interiorize moral rules, like children and psychopaths. I do not see at this point 
problems for Gaus’ proposal from the standpoint of moral phenomenology. Th ere are, 
on the other hand, challenges for Gaus from cases where the issue is that of having a 
reason. It appears as part of our moral phenomenology to direct reactive attitudes even 
in cases when it seems that people do not have suffi  cient reasons in Gaus’ sense, like 
the Nazi. But here subtle explanations and classifi cations are needed. An explanation is 
needed both for why we do not feel indignation and blame for 5th century Athenians, 
as well as for why we feel it for contemporary Nazi and 19th century slave owners in the 
Dixieland. I am not able to give an answer now, but the relevant fact is that looking 
to the phenomenology of reactive emotions, and reactions of criticism that we have, 
it may be that neither strong externalism, nor the internalism that Gaus supports are 
able to completely cover the phenomenology and, consequently, explain our moral 
practice. It seems that a satisfactory explanation still needs to be off ered.6
Th is discussion indicates that the Principle of Moral Autonomy and its establishing 
freedom and equality as endogenous to our engagement in morality may be 
controversial if we discuss the crucial notion of having a reason, and if we look at our 
moral phenomenology. But even if the problems that I have indicated are genuine, 
this does not indicate that we must give up the ideals of freedom and equality, but, 
perhaps, that their foundation is more controversial, or simply diff erent, than what 
Gaus shows. I totally support Gaus’ endorsement of the ideal of free and equal 
persons as the constraint of a theory of social morality. I support his intention to 
resist imposition of views on moral persons in the name of truth, and the “imperious 
claim of private conscience that the social contract-liberal tradition has rejected” (Gaus 
2011, 231), as well. My worry is about whether this can be achieved by a refl ection on 
our moral practice, in the way Gaus does, and whether his strategy is less controversial 
and sectarian in comparison to the appeal to these ideals as foundational substantial 
moral values, as Rawlsians does.
2. 
5  Some such counterexamples have been raised by Nebojsa Zelic in a discussion.
6  I thank Luca Malatesti for the discussion of this point.
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Let’s take that Gaus’ concept of having suffi  cient reasons is victorious and let’s go to 
Gaus’ account of public justifi cation of a moral prescription. A moral prescription is 
publicly justifi ed when each normal moral agent has suffi  cient reasons to internalize it 
(or it is based on a rule that each and every agent has suffi  cient reasons to internalize), 
despite the pluralism that characterizes society. Th is is explained with the Basic 
Principle of Public Justifi cation: “A moral imperative “φ!” in context C, based on rule 
L, is an authoritative requirement of social morality only if each normal moral agent 
has suffi  cient reasons to (a) internalize rule L, (b) hold that L requires Φ-type acts in 
circumstances C and (c) moral agents generally conform to L” (Gaus 2011, 263).
Public justifi cation is achieved through an idealized model that includes idealized 
agents that Gaus calls Members of the Public. MoPs are idealized, but, contrary to 
other forms of idealization in deliberative models, they are not reduced to one single 
model of rational deliberative agent, like in the case of Rawls. On the contrary, they 
are equivalents of the real world agents that they represent, with all their diversities, i.e. 
they refl ect reasonable pluralism. Th ey are sincerely engaged with each others in moral 
deliberation, and not in bargaining or strategic behavior, they recognize others as free 
and equal and they recognize their various standards of moral justifi cation by the only 
limit that they must be intelligible as such. Th eir reasoning is comparative, i.e. they 
always deliberate by comparing a rule to its possible alternatives (or, to the possible 
alternatives that are known as such). One of the alternatives is, also, to not have a rule 
at all on a subject matter. For example, one can prefer not to have any rule that regulates 
sexual behavior. We can easily imagine such a situation, or even think of possible 
examples of people with such a view. Because of the fact that a rule is justifi ed only if 
each MoP has a suffi  cient reason to endorse it, if there is at least one MoP who prefers 
a condition of no rule at all for a domain, then, this is a domain of blameless liberty. 
In other cases, a MoP can prefer the domain to be regulated, but can prefer no rule 
at all in this domain, then one of the specifi c proposed rules. Perhaps, such is the case 
of parents’ rights and duties in relation to their children, as in the previous discussion 
(some regulation, but none when cultural or religious issues are at stake). In such a 
case, the rule is defeated, but the domain is not of blameless liberty. Th e proposals that 
a MoP accepts as preferable to no rule at all in a domain form her individual eligible 
set. Th e set of all individual eligible sets is called socially eligible set. 
Th ere are constraints to the rules that can enter in eligible sets, precisely, it is required 
to restrict the choice “to rules that qualify as bona fi de moral proposals” (Gaus 2011, 
294). Such general constraints that Gaus discusses include generality, weak publicity, 
confl ict resolution and claim validation, rules must provide very weighty reasons to 
act, universalizability and reversibility and a modest common good requirement. Gaus 
indicates how this constraint can function in order to eliminate rules on the example of 
James and John Stuart Mill. Notoriously, James Mill denied the right to vote to women 
and he thought that they are suffi  ciently protected by their fathers or husbands. He 
made a mistake that his son, John Stuart, did not make: he “simply failed to appreciate 
the good of others and the ways rules impact their evaluative standards” (Gaus 2011, 
313). So, there are grounds to reject the voting rule proposed by James Mill. We see 
from this that “one ground for refusing to grant authority to a rule is that, according 
the evaluative standards of a Member of the Public, it fails to adequately meet the 
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constraints on moral rules, especially the requirements of the common good and 
reversibility” (Gaus 2011, 315). 
Other grounds for refusal include rejection based on the excessive cost of moralization 
and blameless liberty as the default. Th e latter will appear as particularly important. In 
order to treat one as free and equal, we must not claim moral authority over a person, 
except if she herself has suffi  cient reasons to endorse this instance of moral authority. 
As a consequence, blameless liberty is the default. As Gaus says, “there is an asymmetry 
between Alf, who claims that he has moral authority over Betty, and Betty who denies 
the authority of the rule. Alf ’s claim is justifi ed only if Betty has reasons to endorse the 
authority; Betty’s claim is justifi ed simply if there are no reasons. She does not have to 
provide a case for rejecting Alf ’s claim to authority” (Gaus 2011, 319). 
Even after the application of these fi lters, there remains wide indeterminacy. How do 
we choose the rule that is fi nally established as the social moral rule in a society? Th e 
fi rst step is represented by ranking them in order to see whether there are proposals 
in the social eligible set that all MoPs rank below other proposals. Th e proposals that 
are not defeated in such a process form the optimal eligible set. Let’s remember that 
MoPs are idealized, but idealized by respecting the pluralism of real world people. 
For this reason, the optimal eligible set includes a variety of alternative rules, with 
no agreement on which are the best for every specifi c domain. But, as Gaus remarks, 
not having social moral regulation of a domain may be costly (imagine the absence of 
regulation of speech). For this reason, the optimal eligible set is not empty. 
How do we choose from the optimal eligible set? Th e fi rst resource that Gaus indicates 
is based on abstraction. “We might bracket our disagreements and identify some shared 
perspective, which provides the grounds for shared reasoning” (Gaus 2011, 335). A 
successful argument from abstraction must respect three conditions. (i) Th ere must 
be a shared perspective. (ii) Th is perspective must identify really important evaluative 
standards. As will become evident, the third condition is particularly important in 
Gaus’ discussion, because it represents a point where he thinks that other arguments 
from abstraction have failed: (iii) “It must be the case that the deliberative conclusions 
are not overturned as the process of abstraction is undone and Members of the Public 
are again understood to be guided by their full set of evaluative standards. What was 
simply ‘freestanding’ must, if it is to be fully justifi ed, serve as a ‘module’ that fi ts 
into each free and equal rational moral person’s set of evaluative criteria. In the end, 
to publicly justify must be to justify in terms of all relevant evaluative criteria” (Gaus 
2011, 336).
Th e abstraction used by Gaus is the perspective of agency. Th ere are several things 
that everybody wants to protect from this perspective. First, there is the presumption 
in favor of liberty, i.e. in social morality, agents have no obligation to justify their 
choices to others, but they must not exercise their liberty in such a way that they 
damage others’ agency. Second, there is autarky, the minimum condition for self-
directed agency. Autarky is absent in the case of obsessive behavior, dissociation of the 
self from its agency, severe disruption of deliberative and belief-forming processes and 
brainwashing. From the perspective of agency we want to protect the rights not to be 
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coerced and deceived. Freedom of thought has a core status. By following Gewirth, 
Gaus remarks the importance of welfare and resources, from the perspective of agency. 
As Gaus says: “Th e perspective of agency leads to endorsing some welfare rights. […] 
Agents, as Members of the Public, would not simply be concerned with maintaining the 
minimal conditions for agency but also with acquiring the goods of an eff ective agency 
— one that is successful in achieving one’s aims, end and values. […] Each Member 
of the Public, deliberating simply on the values of agency, would weigh whether some 
guarantee of goods or resources would have a net positive impact on her agency, given 
the risks encountered in social life” (Gaus 2011, 359).
Th is is what follows from the perspective of agency. It is important, now, to see whether 
it fi ts into each moral person’s standards of evaluation. Gaus thinks that there are 
no problems so far as the, let’s call it, freedom part is concerned. Problems regard 
the welfare and assistance part. Some Members of the public will reject it. For some 
of them, principles of desert (that consists of both a positive notion that includes, 
for example, benefi ts for contribution to the common good or for being prudent, as 
well as bad things that are proper for people who undermine the common good, are 
imprudent, etc.) are a matter of strong devotion. Remember that it is suffi  cient that 
just a few people do not have a suffi  cient reason to embrace a rule in order to defeat 
it. 
As a conclusion, undeserved assistance is defeated. What about a principle that opposes 
only the eff ect of brute luck? “Give people what they deserve, but do not allow basic 
goods to be distributed simply on the basis of brute luck” (Gaus 2011, 365). But, says 
Gaus, even here there is a defeater, precisely Hayek’s criticism of the anti-luck sentiment 
that, according to him, is inconsistent with how markets operate. Th e reward that 
comes from market is reward for obeying others’ wishes, and not reward for providing 
others’ with benefi ts related to doing what we thought best. An entrepreneur’s success 
may derive from being simply in the right place in the right time, which allowed her to 
perceive a successful way to satisfy others’ wants. Th is, Gaus says, is not an unreasonable 
position that can be excluded from the justifi catory public. As a consequence, it is a 
defeater of proposals of redistribution aimed to compensate brute luck. 
Other features are taken in consideration by Gaus. Non adversity to risk is a psychological 
feature that infl uences one’s attitude toward assistance politics. Policies of assistance 
may be incentives to imprudent behaviors, and, as a consequence, prudent people have 
to pay for those imprudent. 
However, Gaus does not deny that some duties of assistance are fully justifi ed: “Consider 
a duty that required us to rescue another (i) from extreme danger to her crucial welfare 
interests when (ii) the imperiled person is not responsible for her plight (iii) and is not 
in a position to easily extricate herself from her predicament, while (iv) we are in a 
position to eff ectively do so at (v) no or very low cost or risk to ourselves. It is hard to 
see how reasonable agents, who understand that unexpected and extreme threats to life, 
limb, and property arise and can destroy one’s ability to pursue one’s values and goals, 
would have defeaters of such a minimal duty. It is also hard to see, though, how a much 
more extensive right to assistance can go undefeated under full justifi cation among a 
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public deliberating on a diverse set of evaluative standards” (Gaus 2011, 367). 
It is important to remark that by his argument, Gaus is not rebutting the possibility of a 
defense of a more egalitarian redistributive state. He is only saying that this justifi cation 
is not provided by a mere appeal to the claims of agency. “Whatever strong rights 
people have to the provision of goods is not an implication of the claims of agency itself 
or the idea of the basic claims of reasonable and rational free and equal persons, but 
involves diffi  cult and controversial issues about the justifi cation of an overall scheme of 
property and proper public policy — issues that are essentially matters for settlement 
in the political arena, in which individuals who reasonably disagree on these matters 
can adjudicate their diff erences. […] In contrast, there is wide and deep consensus on 
agency freedom and abstract rights not to be harmed” (Gaus 2011, 368). We will see 
below further reasons that Gaus off ers to oppose a redistributive state. 
As we see, arguments from abstraction help to make some progress. But a relevant limit 
that their results have is represented by their generality. Th ey need to be interpreted. 
Th ink about the abstract right of freedom of speech. MoPs will agree on such a right 
and on an eligible set of its interpretation, because it is a very important right to 
be protected, but there will be divergences about the interpretations. Here, again, 
there will be the kind of indeterminacy already known: there will be sets of eligible 
interpretations, with no decisive interpretations.7
An important response to the indeterminacies is represented by the partitioning of 
moral space: authority over diff erent parts of the moral space will be devolved to 
diff erent individuals, with a system of jurisdictional rights. Among such rights there 
is, for example, the right to privacy that includes immunity in a sphere where what 
one does is not others’ business and the right that some information about us are not 
disseminated without our consensus. An important jurisdictional right is represented 
by the right of private property. Gaus says that MoPs will endorse a system of property 
rights that will tend to be strong in two senses, these rights will not be easily overridden 
and will be extensive, i.e., they will not include only consumer goods. Gaus remarks, 
for example, the right to be the owner of a residence. Th is right ensures for each person 
the right to have a space where no interference is admitted, while, for example, if all 
residences are owned by the state, it has the right to determine what people can do 
in their homes. “If all buildings are public, the freedom rights of dissenting groups 
are almost certain to be severely curtailed” (Gaus 2011, 378). A further justifi cation 
for the right to property is represented by the fact that it is related to the system of 
values of some people. Th is appears as a strong reason to oppose redistributive states. 
As Gaus says, “Entrepreneurship is itself a form of human fl ourishing. […] Start-ups, 
innovation, risk taking, organizing groups to resolve problems and implement new 
ideas – all these are not simply ways to produce the stuff  to be distributed according 
to ‘economic justice’: they are basic to evaluative standards of some Members of the 
Public” (Gaus 2011, 379). Such evaluative standards can function as defeaters of 
7  Andrew Lister raises an interesting problem here, whether Gaus’s discussion of the freedom of speech is coherent 
with the discussion of redistributive politics. Th e problem that Lister (2013) discusses is whether there is a divergence 
in the latter, in comparison to the former, because when Gaus debates redistributive politics, part of his strategy is to 
support the primacy of the less coercive rules in the eligible set, which is not affi  rmed in the discussion of freedom of 
speech. 
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redistributive policies. To be sure, in the part of the book from which I have extrapolated 
the quotation, Gaus directly argues against socialism. But maybe the argument could 
be intended to be directed toward liberal egalitarian distributive policies as well. 
We are still in a condition of indeterminacy, although it is reduced. How can we arrive to 
more determinate results? Gaus rejects the answer off ered by the proposal of reasoning 
together, i.e. deliberative democracy. He thinks that this is the way that can lead to 
authoritarianism and oppression. “In the end deliberative democrats acknowledge that 
we must cut off  discussion and take a vote, but then the majority is subjugating others 
to their judgment in the name of public reason — reason that is not shared by the 
dissenting minority. Once we accept that our disagreements are widespread and deep 
[…] democratic procedures simply are not up to the task of collective commensuration” 
(Gaus 2011, 388). 
Here evolution comes back in the story. People coordinate in their social interrelations 
on some rules. All such rules are, then, justifi ed by the standards of all MoPs, because 
they are selected from the eligible set. No MoP can complain, even if the rules on 
which MoPs converged are low ranked in her individual eligible set. “Ex ante, Betty 
does not have reason to accept y over x, nor does Alf have reason to accept x rather 
than y. Th ey do, however, have reason to coordinate on either of the two requirements 
rather than none at all. Th at is, they have reason to coordinate on some member of the 
eligible set. […] Should Alf and Betty fi nd themselves at x/x neither would have reason 
to unilaterally change his or her action. Given each of their evaluative standards, they 
would have the most reason to act on rule x. Should they instead to fi nd themselves 
at y/y, each would then have most reason (given his or her evaluative standards) to 
act on y. […] consulting simply his or her own evaluative standards, each has decisive 
reason to freely endorse whichever moral requirement they have coordinated on” (Gaus 
2011, 394). Th is is so because each MoP has two distinct desiderata, one is to have the 
possibility to act on the moral requirements that correspond in the best possible way to 
her evaluative standards, the other to act on moral requirements that others endorse, 
as well, in order to make legitimate authoritative moral demands respectful of others’ 
status as free and equals. A further consequence is that in the coordination process, 
MoPs will converge on options that become slightly more popular than the others. Th e 
equilibrium that will be achieved is, therefore, path dependent. Th ere is no external, or 
ex ante, reason to judge one equilibrium better than another, but once an equilibrium is 
established “each Member of the Public, consulting only her own evaluative standards, 
will freely act on the moral requirement in equilibrium” (Gaus 2011, 400). Th e rules 
in equilibrium are, for each agent, what best satisfi es her standards considering what 
other MoPs are doing. Th ey are “the choice of social creatures, who must take into 
account what others are doing, and cannot dictate to the group their preferred rule” 
(Gaus 2011, 402). Once a society has found equilibrium on a rule, this rule is the one 
that is rationally justifi ed, “it then is the one rule that all have reason to endorse” (Gaus 
2011, 403). 
One might object that it is unfair that in the equilibrium rules are justifi ed that are the 
favored option for some MoPs (i.e. the evaluative standards of some MoPs support the 
rule at the highest level), while at the bottom of the ranking of the eligible set of other 
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MoPs (i.e. it may even be the case that the rule is just a little bit preferable than no rule 
at all). Th e suggestion is that the reasonable solution would be to compromise, i.e. to 
bargain and to look for a compromise solution. But Gaus says that it is not legitimate 
to require compromise and half-meetings. Public justifi cation is not “about the correct 
compromise concerning how much the moral rules we live under refl ect our basic 
normative convictions, as if they were pots of money to be divided up, or negotiation 
aims to be haggled over” (Gaus 2011, 332). He replies to the critics by saying that 
“compromise is not always a good, and it certainly is not always demanded in virtue 
of a person’s devotion to a moral life. Th at each member of the Public accepts that 
some option z is in the optimal eligible set only if each and every free and equal person 
has suffi  cient reason to accord z moral authority on the basis of her own evaluative 
standards, and that all the elements in the set satisfy the formal constraints on moral 
rules already shows that all Members of the Public have a commitment to respect the 
standards of others and do not press for moral rules that some cannot freely endorse” 
(Gaus 2011, 407).
Some MoPs will be very reluctant to accept coercion, i.e. they think that in many cases 
the benefi ts of coercion do not outweigh the costs. Such are, says Gaus, classical liberals. 
Although the optimal eligible set may contain laws far away from their ideal, they will 
tend to move the eligible set in a classical liberal direction, i.e. to reduce the space of 
coercion and state intervention. Again, an objection will appear that they have to meet 
others on halfway. But this reply has already been rebutted. Classical liberals’ views are 
reasonable and intelligible and can be parts of the eligible set. As he has already said, 
Gaus repeats that this is suffi  cient. Th ere is no need for further compromising, “this is 
to turn justifi cation and self-legislation into a bargain” (Gaus 2011, 506).
So, in virtue of the fact that their views are reasonable, classical liberals reduce the 
range of the eligible set. Is it possible to counter them by criticisms of the small state, 
by evaluative standards that remark that low levels of law coercion do more harm 
than good? “Jack might hold that a classical liberal state that enforces property rights 
with a modest provision for the poor imposes coercion costs on the poor that exceeds 
the benefi ts, and so such state is not justifi ed in his view. […] What is important 
about Jack is that he accepts Alf ’s ‘Millian’ evaluation of the costs of coercion, but 
nevertheless rejects the least coercive option” (Gaus 2011, 507). However, Gaus replies, 
Jack’s objection cannot be successful. Th e classical liberal state performs important 
functions, for example the protection, articulation and development of the rights of 
agency, privacy and freedom of association. In virtue of this, classical liberal ‘small’ 
states will have justifi ed authority. Although this kind of state is not optimal from 
the standpoint of Jack’s evaluative standards, it is nevertheless justifi ed by them. As 
we already know, optimality is not required in order to be included in the evaluative 
set and, so, here, the ‘classical tilt’ of liberalism wins: “all reasonable persons devoted 
to the basic rights of body, the person, speech, and so on accept that the benefi ts of 
political authority exceed the costs across a wide range of systems. Given the order 
of justifi cation, the basic liberties of the person and civil rights are powerful justifi ers 
of small states — although larger states certainly reasonably can be thought to be 
optimal” (Gaus 2011, 508). In brief, even those who do not rank the small state highly 
will prefer it to the absence of at least the protection that it off ers, while “classically 
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liberal-inclined citizens will rank few if any redistributive laws as better than no laws at 
all” (Gaus 2011, 521). Th e reason for this rejection is related to the idea that the more 
a state is redistributive, the more it is coercive. For example, noncompliance rises as 
tax rates rise, with the consequence of increasing the amount of money spent by the 
state in order to avoid this and coercion of noncompliers, inclusive of intervention 
by criminal law. Furthermore, increase of taxes makes some options more diffi  cult, in 
particular in the domain of entrepreneurship that, as we have seen, is part of the system 
of value of some agents. 
Notoriously, John Rawls has put forward criticisms to some forms of states characterized 
by private property, in particular to those forms that allow great inequalities and do 
not guarantee the fair value of equal political liberties and do not have institutions 
employed to maximize the long-term prospects of the less advantaged free and equal 
persons. Gaus rebuts Rawls’s argument in favor of liberal socialism and property-owning 
democracy (a system that allows private property but, by the dispersion of wealth and 
capital, prevents owners of property to exercise the control of the whole economy 
and of political life, as well) and insists on the importance of the maintenance of 
extensive private property that includes means of production. In particular, he appeals 
to empirical data that seem to confi rm the importance of extensive private property 
inclusive of means of production for the protection of political rights, taken as basic 
in the order of justifi cation. As Gaus says, “there has never been a political order 
characterized by deep respect for personal freedom that was not based on a market 
order with widespread private ownership in the means of production” (Gaus 2011, 
513-514). Rawls’s alternatives do not have any empirical confi rmation, because they 
have never existed. On the other hand, empirical data show that “in the world as we 
have known it, the protection of economic liberty and private property is associated 
with states that do a better job of institutionalizing eff ective political rights (as well 
as civil rights)” (Gaus 2011, 515). Rawlsians may reply by saying that even if orders 
of extensive private property of means of production are necessary in order to protect 
civic and political rights, those systems that allow high economic inequalities are a 
menace for the fair value of political liberty. Gaus replies that the claim is simply 
taken as obvious and conjectural: “Whether citizens have real input — whether their 
political rights actually have ‘fair value’ — is a matter of complex sociology, involving 
the features of political culture, including levels of civic participation, institutional 
structures relating business and governments, the existence of power centers outside of 
government, levels of overall wealth, and so on” (Gaus 2011, 517). In the interpretation 
of empirical data, Gaus says that the most important variable to explain the level of 
protection of political rights is represented by the level of wealth and income, while 
equality in their distribution is a relatively minor factor. 
3. 
Gaus’ proposal is the most relevant alternative to Rawls’ in the domain of public reason 
liberalism. I now dedicate some thoughts to see how much and in what points the 
two proposals are divergent. Both proposals accept the idea of free and equal agents as 
basic. Both proposals accept the idea of reasonable pluralism. Gaus remarks his more 
stringent adherence to reasonable pluralism. He criticizes Rawls and Rawlsians for 
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not respecting this idea fully. Th ere are mainly two reasons. For Rawls and Rawlsians, 
public justifi cation is based on shared standards of evaluation, exclusive, for example, 
of comprehensive doctrines. For Gaus, public justifi cation is based on all bona fi de 
moral intelligible standards of evaluation. Second, although both Rawls and Gaus 
employ an idealization, Rawls’s agents are idealized in a way that renders all of them 
deprived of their specifi c features, and, therefore, the choice is reduced to the choice of 
a single abstract subject. On the other hand, Gaus’s idealized agents, MoPs, maintain 
the pluralistic features of their real-world counterparts. It might be said that Gaus’s 
model has stronger empirical constraints than Rawls’ (not to speak about Rawlsians’ 
like Jonathan Quong, who says that even Rawls does not admit suffi  cient idealization).8 
All this must be taken with some caution. It is true that basically Rawls’s theory is based 
on a freestanding argument grounded on idealization. But it is also required that the 
principles of justice obtained in the abstraction must be confi rmed by the possibility 
to cohere with each agent’s comprehensive doctrine. Th ere are, therefore, empirical 
constraints respectful of reasonable pluralism of worldviews for Rawls, as well (Rawls 
1993/1996, 385-388).
On the other hand, as we have seen, there is a role for abstraction in Gaus, as well, 
and this is the abstraction represented by the perspective of agency. Th e results of 
this perspective must be confi rmed, let’s say, empirically by the whole set of reasons 
that the agents have (‘empirically’ must be qualifi ed here; as I have shown there is 
some idealization even in the identifi cation of what the reasons of agents are). At this 
level, some of the rights justifi ed at the level of abstraction are defeated. So, the main 
diff erence between Rawls and Gaus appears to be the expectation of what happens 
when the results of the abstraction are compared with the overall reasons of agents. 
Rawls expects that they will be mainly confi rmed, by arriving to an egalitarian liberal 
view of justice. It is in this sense that Gaus’s statement “the core idea throughout his 
work is the argument from abstraction in the original position” (Gaus 2011, 336) is 
true. On the other hand, Gaus expects that some of them will be defeated and that the 
result is a classical liberal view. 
Although there is an ample debate between Rawlsians and Gaus on the appropriateness 
of employment of religious reasons in public justifi cation, such reasons in my view do 
not make a relevant diff erence in the results to which the two sides will arrive. Th e reason 
is that in virtue of the presumption of freedom, religious reasons can be effi  caciously 
employed, for Gaus, only in the defense from coercion, not in support of requirements 
of coercion, while, on the other hand, the defense of religious rights is relevant for 
Rawlsians, as well. As Freeman says, “Only the most compelling reasons of justice, those 
regarding the protection of others’ fundamental rights, should be allowed to outweigh 
the freedom of religious doctrine, sacraments and liturgical practices” (Freeman 2002, 
24). In Freeman’s opinion, the rigid application of the liberal requirement of equal 
treatment can generate inequalities, because equal treatment under one law can cause 
unequal treatment under another law. So, for example, equal treatment under the 
law that prohibits use of (some) drugs can generate unequal treatment under the law 
that ensures freedom of conscience and the related freedom of religion. Th is is the 
8  Quong 2011.
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case, among else, of Pueblo Indians, for whom the prohibition to use peyote interferes 
directly with a sacramental practice.
Th e important diff erence regards welfare, economics and social rights. Here we have 
Rawls’s egalitarian liberalism on one side and Gaus’ classical liberalism on the other 
side. In other words, for Rawls, the deliberative model from abstraction leads to 
a robust egalitarian liberal model that survives the process of full justifi cation, i.e. 
its confrontation with all reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Th is module is not 
represented by a specifi c theory of justice, like Rawls’s justice as fairness, but includes 
three main elements (basic rights and freedoms, special priority they have, and the 
resources needed in order to make eff ective use of them). We may say that, at the end, 
Rawls, like Gaus, does not propose a specifi c conception of justice as the result of a 
philosophical debate, as the conception that must be adopted by the state. He opts for 
something like an eligible set. Th e diff erence between Rawls and Gaus here is that for 
Rawls the eligible set includes egalitarian liberal principles of justice, while for Gaus 
the eligible set is pushed in a classical liberal direction.
It seems that the focus of Gaus’ criticism of Rawls’s proposal regards the robustness of the 
egalitarian liberal module. Further, he criticizes the view of institutional instantiation 
of the module proposed by Rawls, which includes two possible kinds of society, liberal 
socialism and property-owning democracy as compared to a classical liberal society 
characterized by the small state. I try to show that the Rawlsian module is defensible 
and that the classical liberal small state does not have a proper space in the eligible set. 
Alternatively, there is space in the eligible set for forms of socialism, as well. After that, 
I raise some doubts to the empirical arguments that Gaus puts forward against Rawls’s 
proposals of ordering of society. I start with the fi rst discussion, the one that regards 
the robustness of the Rawlsian liberal egalitarian module. 
As we have already seen, in Gaus’ opinion such a module does not survive abstraction, 
in virtue of some evaluative standards incompatible with it (importance of extensive 
property rights inclusive of means of production for the protection of some important 
rights of agency and for political rights, views about the functioning of market, the value 
that some agents attribute to entrepreneurship, risk of increase of coercion). Precisely, 
it is the third element of the module that is problematic. It is rejected by some MoPs 
(MoP1), who, at the same time, are ready to support moral rules and institutional 
arrangements important for all other MoPs, as well (MoP2). MoP2 (although part of 
what is justifi ed by their evaluative standards is excluded), have reasons to accept the 
restricted set of rules acceptable for MoP1, because it responds to important parts of 
their evaluative standards, and, therefore, for them it is better to accept such a system, 
than to not have any system of social moral rules and moral relations with MoP1. 
But is this so? MoP2 risk to be deprived of something really essential to them, i.e. 
the resources needed in order to make eff ective use of their freedoms. Why would 
they accept a moral relation with people who are ready to leave them deprived of the 
insurance of such resources? Gaus’ answer is that it would be even worse for them to 
refuse the coordination with MoP1 on a classical liberal state. But there are problems 
nevertheless. MoP1 have toward MoP2 more of a strategic stance like in the case of 
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the ultimatum games (Gaus 2011, 119-122), than a cooperative moral stance. An 
important lesson from the ultimatum games is that “If in such games the Proposer gives 
herself the lion’s share, leaving the Disposer with her absolute minimum, the Disposer 
will reject the off er” (Gaus 2011, 404). But Gaus rejects the comparison between the 
classical liberal moral equilibrium that he describes and the ultimatum games. First, 
contrary to the ultimatum games, in the case at issue there are no resources to be 
distributed, there is no amount of utility that may be transferred from one person to 
another. Th e issue is about how well the agents’ standards are justifi ed. Second, Gaus 
interprets the results of ultimatum games as punishment of violation of norms, but the 
issue, here, is about searching for mutually acceptable norms — there are no norms 
at the moment, the same as there is not an ideal of fairness. It is also inappropriate to 
appeal to the notion of reasonableness, as it is interpreted, for example, by Rawls, as 
willingness to meet others halfway. Gaus rejects the idea that compromise is good in 
moral issues, where it is “certainly not always demanded in virtue of a person’s devotion 
to a moral life. Th at each member of the Public accepts that some option z is in the 
optimal eligible set only if each and every free and equal person has suffi  cient reason to 
accord z moral authority on the basis of her own evaluative standards, and that all the 
elements in the set satisfy the formal constraints on moral rules already shows that all 
Members of the Public have a commitment to respect the standards of others and do 
not press for moral rules that some cannot freely endorse” (Gaus 2011, 407). In brief, 
if there are 10 proposals in the eligible set, there are no reasons to require a compromise 
for MoPs to meet at a point where the rule is fairly high for the evaluative standards of 
all, and not, let’s say ranked 10th by the standards of some. 
I think that there is a relevant similarity between ultimatum games and the classical 
liberal (as opposed to egalitarian liberal) coordination, precisely the following one. In 
both cases we have a situation where one side off ers to the other side the minimum 
that it needs to off er, based on the fact that for the other side such a minimum is better 
than not having it. Th e lesson of the ultimatum games is that people tend to reject 
such off ers. Gaus says that the reason is the reaction toward unfairness, not a stance 
for equality. But, why not a reaction toward the absence of a cooperative stance of the 
other side, represented by the fact that that side takes advantage of its position and 
avoids to compromise and meet half-way?
Th e appropriate cooperative stance in the case of establishing social morality is readiness 
to compromise when possible by taking care of what is essential to all parts. Th is sense 
of compromise and of meeting halfway is what constitutes the will to establish a fair 
stable social cooperation. How would the cooperative stance look like? It does not 
require complete renouncing of some of the evaluative standards indicated by Gaus 
opposed to the egalitarian proposal. A better perspective is to consider how much these 
evaluative criteria can be satisfi ed by concessions to ensure to everyone the resources 
for an eff ective use of basic freedoms and rights. It may be possible to give a positive 
response to the claim of agency (help some to maintain the conditions of eff ective 
agency), while saving at the same time the core of the evaluative standards of those who 
value desert, do not see luck as something that legitimates redistributive troubles, and 
value entrepreneurship. One can be an entrepreneur even in a redistributive situation 
(or a manager in a structure of collective property, instead of private ownership of 
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means of production; there were highly estimated managers in the socialist Yugoslavia, 
for example), and because the egalitarian liberal system still allows inequalities there 
would be space both for taking in consideration the evaluative standards of desert, as 
well as of those who disregard considerations about luck as morally relevant.
For many MoPs there are reasons to reject the inegalitarian liberal equilibrium other 
than ultimatum games motivations. In fact, more important reasons. Namely, the 
denial of the egalitarian liberal element of Rawls’ proposal represents the refusal of 
something essential to many. Let’s remember that the criterion for a rule for being 
part of the eligible set of rules is that there are no MoPs for which it is better not to 
have regulation of a domain, than to have it regulated by that rule. It appears that, in 
consideration of the threat that for some is represented by the refusal of egalitarian 
liberalism, it is worth giving a better chance than Gaus does to the hypothesis that for 
some MoPs it is better not to have any rule that protects private property of means 
of production (and, therefore, to live in an order of collective property of means of 
production), than to live in a society where rules that protect private property exclude, 
or are not related to, some level of redistributive policies.
I add a consideration to the general thought about claims of agency to strengthen the 
egalitarian stance. Th e consideration regards studies that relate health to the social 
status of people. “Poverty, poor nutrition, poor living and working conditions, and 
unhealthy behaviors, and so on, may be much more important determinants of health 
than access to health care. Th is is the thesis of the ‘social determinants of health’” 
(Wolff  2011, 130). Two elements are striking. “On just about every indicator there is a 
‘social gradient’ of health, corresponding to social class. In 1980 the higher one’s social 
class, the better one’s health and the longer one lived. […] It appears that the NHS had 
improved the health of those in the higher social classes, while making little diff erence 
to those of the other classes. […] For this reason, the Black report […] argued for 
massive public investment in anti-poverty action to address health inequality” (Wolff  
2011, 135-136). Similar arguments were repeated in a newer report, i.e. the Acheson 
report of 1998. As Jonathan Wolff  shows, together with material causes of worse health 
conditions, there are psychological factors. But such factors, again, are related to lower 
position in social status (Wolff  2011, 137).
From this we see that social inequalities, together with inequalities in the social status, 
not only aff ect the general capacity of agency, but a particularly important part of it, 
i.e. health, which is an essential component of the lives of agents. Again, it may be 
possible to think about MoPs who refuse redistributive rules inspired by the protection 
of values important for other MoPs, in the specifi c case the value of health, but various 
claims of agency, as well. Gaus indicates the possibility of agents who rank health at 
a lower level than other values, like, in his example, motorcycle drivers who prefer 
the excitement of driving without helmets, to the protection of health (Gaus 2011, 
537-538). It may be possible to say the same about people who remark the value 
of entrepreneurship and the adrenaline of market competition. Th ere may be several 
replies to the opposition to egalitarian liberalism represented by such characters. 
Th e fi rst reply refers to the notorious Mill’s bridge example (Mill 1859/1977, 294). 
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In the example, as it is very well known, Mill says that it is not a case of illegitimate 
coercion to stop a person from crossing a bridge, even though the person wants to cross 
it. Th e reason is that the bridge is in danger and, therefore, when we stop the person 
we, in fact, do what the person would do if she fully considered the situation. Probably, 
many persons refuse redistribution because they do not suffi  ciently consider situations 
when they can be in need of it. So, the fi rst reply appeals to the notion of ‘having a 
reason’. One’s reason to support redistributive rules can be a reason that one would 
endorse after respectable reasoning, it does not need to be a reason that one actually 
endorses. Ayn Rand’s life teaches in the specifi c case.
Th e second reply relates to what Gaus says about restricting people who are part of 
the moral constituency: “Such people do not include […] monomaniacs who are 
solely committed to one and only one value, such as one who cares about nothing 
but counting blades of grass, or his stamp collection. Such persons are the stuff  of 
philosophical stories and objections, but in many ways they are beyond (or at the edge 
of ) the common human horizon” (Gaus 2011, 281). It does not seem implausible 
to say that people who are ready to put in danger essential aspects of agency for the 
sake of only one value are very close to this description of monomaniacs. I would say 
this about the motorcycle driver described by Gaus, but I do not see as very diff erent 
people who threat essential aspects of agency for the sake of total and unconditional 
protection of one of the values inimical to egalitarian liberalism indicated above. 
Th e third reply is that some such characters may have alternative ways to satisfy their 
passion. If they are inspired by the fl ourishing constituted by managerial activities 
described above, they can do this even in an egalitarian order. Th ey can do this even 
in a socialist order, as I have said above. If they are, instead, attracted by feeling the 
adrenaline of market competition, they can look for adrenaline, for example, in free 
climbing, Blue Tornado at Gardaland (or a rollercoaster at Disney World), etc., or, they 
may require exemption from the protection in the market competition. 
Fourth, people can reasonably reject a moral relation with agents who want to put in 
danger essential components of their life, inclusive of such an important element as 
health expectancies, and opt for only strategic relation with them. Perhaps, this is what 
Gaus intends to say when he writes “If a rule of our social morality is below a person’s 
‘baseline’, her best response to the moral actions of others does not involve her also 
adopting the moral stance, but perhaps a prudential or narrowly sectarian one” (Gaus 
2011a).
As a consequence of this part of the paper, it appears that the eligible set is pushed in a 
more egalitarian direction than Gaus writes. On one hand, many MoPs will be strongly 
motivated to do so, because they strongly oppose a non redistributive condition that 
does not protect claims of agency. On the other hand, MoPs who endorse values 
opposed to egalitarian liberalism are not in as bad a situation in the egalitarian liberal 
equilibrium, because they can satisfy the core of their values even in a redistributive 
order. 
In support of the previous discussion, I refer to a famous quotation from J.S. Mill: 
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“If the institution of private property necessarily carried with it as a consequence, 
that the produce of labour should be apportioned as we now see it, almost in inverse 
ration to labour — the largest portions to those who have never worked at all, the 
next largest to those whose work is almost nominal, and so in a descending scale, the 
remuneration dwindling as the work grows harder and more disagreeable, until now 
the most fatiguing and exhausting bodily labour cannot count with certainty on being 
able to earn even the necessaries of life; if this or Communism were the alternative, all 
the diffi  culties, great or small, of Communism would be but dust in the balance” (Mill 
1848/1965, 207).
To be sure, Mill here speaks critically about injustices that derive from a distribution 
that does not correspond to the desert of people engaged, and not about ensuring 
to everybody the means for eff ective agency. Nevertheless, what is important is that 
Mill admits that there may be some conditions, in particular such that they leave 
some people at the edge of the possibility to live, that render preferable a system 
characterized by a regime of collective property instead of an order of private property 
characterized by such inequalities (in any event, it appears that Mill’s quotation is a 
good ground to start thinking about a criticism of the actual situation of economies 
based on private property of means of production). To be sure, it is not so easy to 
make use of Mill’s quotation in opposition to Gaus’ view of the position of classical, 
as opposed to egalitarian, liberalism in the eligible set. After all, Gaus himself shows 
sympathy for Mill’s quotation (Gaus 1999, 168-178).
Moreover, as history shows, communism has proved to be able to be more repressive 
than Mill imagined, as well as of producing poverty for ample parts of population, or, 
at least unable to rescue them from it. But, such a result is not necessary. Alternative 
possibilities can be the source for further thinking about what can happen in the 
eligible set. In the socialist Yugoslavia, extensive property of means of production was 
not allowed, but, for example, from the later 70s, although political liberties were 
strongly restricted, there was a considerable level of tolerance of personal liberties (in 
the choice of art expression — inclusive of criticisms of the regime —, practicing 
religion — although this was limited to the private sphere —, travelling, leisure, sexual 
freedoms, etc.), together with a high level of protection of social rights.
Although I don’t know about precise data, but as it is visible to everybody who lives in 
the territory, there are people who think that the increase of formal political liberties in 
the new order established in the states formed with the dissolution of the Federation 
does not off er a positive payoff  for the loss in the level of protection of social rights. 
Put in other terms, it is possible to say that the claims of agency are for many more 
compromised now than in the previous order and that they complain for this. If this is 
so, it seems possible to say that MoPs representing such people will exclude small state 
views from the eligible set: for them it is preferable to live in an order with collective 
property of means of production (even if with strongly reduced political liberties, but 
with a considerable level of personal liberties), than in an order of private property 
of means of production and high social inequalities, with a low level of protection of 
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social rights, even if this is related to wider formal political liberties.9 
Th is probably is the view shared by many people who adhere to the various ‘occupy’ 
and ‘indignados’ movements in the post-2008 years. In all these movements there 
appear to be people rather disinterested in the formal political liberties of parliamentary 
democracy, in favor of a strong protection of social rights.
If what I am saying is right, MoPs representing people ready to accept socialism are 
among agents who will push the eligible set in an egalitarian direction. One can object 
that these agents cannot infl uence the structure of the eligible set, because they are 
not reasonable. Th ey renounce to some aspects of protection of agency that they have 
reasons to protect, i.e. political liberties, as well as to a more extended protection of 
personal freedoms. But I do not see the objection as decisive. After all, they are ready 
to renounce to this only for the sake of higher resources needed for protecting agency, 
or aspects of agency more important for them. Th ey are symmetrical to the ‘small 
state’ oriented MoPs, who renounce to the protection of some of the claims of agency 
(the welfare and social part) for the sake of some of their values. Both sides appear 
to propose rules not acceptable for the other side. In any case, in order to oppose 
Gaus’ classical liberalism, it is not needed to insist with the pressure coming from the 
socialist side. Th e thesis that I support is that it is diffi  cult to appeal to the importance 
of political and civic liberties as a trump against egalitarian liberalism. Only extreme 
and radical forms of egalitarianism are severely not acceptable for classical liberalism. 
My claim is on the same line as Lister’s, when he says that no right to assistance at 
all is reasonably preferable to only an extravagantly strong specifi cation of the right 
to assistance (Lister 2013). Egalitarian liberalism can accommodate the core of the 
values of classical liberalism, although not in the way classical liberals fi nd optimal. 
As a consequence, egalitarian liberalism seems to be the stable equilibrium between 
diff erent agents if they want a common social morality. Obviously, a great deal of work 
must be done to complete the argument. ‘Acceptable’ must be defi ned more precisely, 
because for Gaus the question is ‘acceptable in comparison to what alternative?’
By this, we arrive at the issues of the justifi cation baseline already raised by other 
authors (Lister 2010, 2013; Arneson 2011; Enoch forthcoming). Crucial to Gaus’ view 
of establishing the optimal eligible set is to choose rules in comparison to the option 
of not having any rule on the matter, at all. Th e problem, here, is how to group issues 
together. Th e more, as Lister says, we zoom out, the less libertarian results we have. It 
appears to still be an open question whether Gaus has resources to avoid this strategy. 
On one hand, he declares this as the job of the political process, not of philosophy 
(Gaus 2010, 200). On the other hand, the principled criterion that he off ers in taking 
separated issues on justifi cation independent (two issues are independent only if no 
MoP’s ranking of the rules regulating one of them depends on the rules that regard the 
other (Gaus 2011, 495)) seems to push away from the classical liberal proposal because 
9  By the way, it may be worth noting that it appears exaggerated when Gaus claims that private possession of apart-
ments is important for personal freedom. In the socialist Yugoslavia there were not intrusions in personal life that 
depended on the fact that many people did not have private possession of apartments, nor was there any special protec-
tion of personal life related to such possession for the people that had it. On the other hand, at least as represented in 
Breaking the Code, the fi lm about Alan Turing’s life, private possession of his house did not protect him from repression 
of his sexual personal life.
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it seems to favor the zooming out strategy (Lister 2013). For the sake of this paper, 
I hope to have shown that egalitarian oriented MoPs still need to be discussed in the 
context of Gaus’ proposal. 
I fi nish with some worries about Gaus’ empirical arguments against Rawls’ institutional 
framework for the respect of fair value of political liberties. Here I move to consider the 
discussion of Gaus’ comparison of the classical liberal state with possible alternatives. 
Gaus says that a classical liberal state puts agents in the fairest political position in 
comparison to all possible orders whose behavior we can reasonably predict. Is this 
really so? Gaus indicates data that appear to confi rm that the level of political liberties 
is primarily correlated to the level of welfare of society, and not to the level of economic 
inequality (Gaus 2011, 511-521). But it seems to me that there are some problems 
with his conclusions. First, there is the problem that the correlation that Gaus indicates 
between societies characterized by property possession (even when characterized by 
inequalities) and respect of political rights, stated as it is, may be only a correlation. It 
is still doubtful whether there is a causal relation, as well. For example, it can be the 
case that cultural and historical causes are predominant. 
Second, there is data that appears to establish an unfair distribution of political 
power, in relation to the distribution of income. It appears that one of the plausible 
interpretations of the data is that actual democracies, even if they realize the highest 
level of political freedoms in comparison to other states (even with states characterized 
by higher level of economic equality), do not satisfy the requirement of fair value of 
political liberties. Th is is told, for example, in the UNCTAD’s analysis of policies 
that are obviously oriented in favoring the rich against the middle class and the poor: 
“Neither globalization nor technological improvements inevitably require the kind of 
dramatic shift in the distribution of income that favours the very rich and deprives 
the poor and the middle-class of the means to improve their living standards. On 
the contrary, with more appropriate national and international policies that take into 
account the crucial importance of aggregate demand for capital formation, structural 
change and growth dynamics, job creation can be accelerated, inequality reduced and 
the requisite degree of economic and social stability guaranteed” (UNCTAD 2012).10 
Th e UNCTAD’s analysis that I have indicated summarized in the quotation speaks 
primarily of the consequences of political economies of many states, i.e. political 
economies that favor rich people. Th is is a possible strong indicator of the fact that 
there is an inequality in the distribution of power. Th e question is: why, if increasing 
inequalities are the results of political choice and not of inevitable trends, and if they 
damage the interests of the vast majority of the population, are they endorsed in 
democratic societies? Th e thesis of unfairness in the value of political liberties appears 
to me as the fi rst candidate for the explanation. Th is, in fact, is Oxfam’s thesis: “If, in 
the words of the old adage ‘money equals power’ then more unequal societies represent 
a threat to meaningful democracy. Th is power can be exercised legally, with hundreds 
of millions spent each year in many countries on lobbying politicians, or illegitimately 
with money used to corrupt the political process and purchase democratic decision 
10  See also UNCTAD 2012b.
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making. Joseph Stiglitz and others have pointed out the way in which fi nancial 
liberalisation led to huge power for the fi nancial industry, which in turn has led to 
further liberalisation. In the UK the governing Conservative party receives over half its 
donations from the fi nancial services industry. Capture of politics by elites is also very 
prevalent in developing countries, leading to policies that benefi t the richest few and 
not the poor majority, even in democracies” (Oxfam 2013).
I am not ready, here, to endorse the thesis without caution (although I believe that it 
is true). In the description of the politics of inequality that Paul Krugman off ers in his 
Th e Conscience of a Liberal, there are several descriptions of the growth of the politics 
of inequality. Financial support has, in Krugman’s analysis, an important role, and, 
as this author indicates, it is much more directed to conservative programs, than to 
liberal or progressive projects. But, as results from Krugman’s analysis, the politics of 
inequality could not have wined without an alliance with conservative illiberal values 
shared by lower classes, as well. Th e relation between fi nancial advantage and political 
success in democracy might be more complex than appears at fi rst glance and the role 
of diff erences in the value of political freedoms must be a topic for detailed analysis. 
In this sense, I agree with Gaus that Rawls’ thesis needs more support. However, Gaus’ 
reply needs more support than he off ers to it, as well. Th e causes of the actual supremacy 
of some countries in the question of political freedoms can be more complex than it 
may appear at fi rst glance and it might depend, for example, primarily on historical 
or cultural reasons. On the other hand, it is important to see in more details whether 
analysis of such countries would show unfairness in the value of political liberties, after 
all. If this is so, the moral equilibrium that results from such processes might be such 
as not attracting the stable adherence of many members of society.11 
11  I thank very much, for the real precious help, numerous colleagues and friends who have discussed earlier drafts of 
the paper, and, more in general, issues of public reason with me. First, I thank Gerald Gaus for his participation and 
for his discussion at the symposium dedicated to Th e Order of Public Reason that the Department of Philosophy has 
organized in December 2011, as well as for all other occasions to discuss issues of political philosophy during his stay 
in Rijeka. I owe many thanks to Jonathan Quong for his patient and thoughtful discussions in Rijeka and Rome. Enes 
Kulenović has read the paper and has sent me important comments on an earlier draft of the paper. Many thanks to 
the colleagues who have participated in the reading group dedicated to Th e Order of Public Reason at the Department of 
Philosophy of the University of Rijeka: Boran Bercic, Nenad Miscevic, Neven Petrovic and Nenad Smokrovic, and, in 
particular, to the colleagues who have participated in the reading group from its beginning to the end, Zdenka Brzovic, 
Marko Jurjako, and the “Fellowship of Public Reason”: Ivan Cerovac, Luca Malatesti (who has read several drafts of 
the paper), Andrea Mesanovic, Snjezana Prijic-Samarzija and Nebojsa Zelic. Many thanks to Riccardo Mangano for 
language editing.
EuJAP | Vol. 9 | No. 1 | 2013
50
REFERENCES
Arneson, R. 2011. For a New Liberalism. CATO Unbound. Accessed April 8, 2013. http://
www.cato-unbound.org/2011/10/10/gerald-gaus/range-justice-or-how-retrieve-liberal-
sectual-tolerance
DePaul, M. 1993. Balance and Refi nement. Beyond Coherence Methods of Moral Inquiry. London: 
Routledge.
Enoch D. forthcoming. Th e Disorder of Public Reason. A Critical Study of Gerald Gaus’ Th e 
Order of Public Reason: A Th eory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded 
World.
Freeman, S. 2002. Liberalism and the Accommodation of Group Claims. In P. Kelly (ed.), 
Multiculturalism Reconsidered (18-30). Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Gaus, G. 1996. Justifi catory Liberalism. An Essay on Epistemology and Political Th eory. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Gaus, G. 1999. Social Philosophy. New York: M.E. Sharpe.
Gaus, G. 2010. On Two Critics of Justifi catory Liberalism. A Response to Wall and Lister. 
Philosophy, Politics and Economics 9 (2): 177-212.
Gaus, G. 2011. Th e Order of Public Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gaus, G. 2011a. For a New Liberalism. CATO Unbound. Accessed April 8, 2013. http://
www.cato-unbound.org/2011/10/10/gerald-gaus/range-justice-or-how-retrieve-liberal-
sectual-tolerance
Gaus, G. 2012. Sectarianism without Perfection? Quong’s Political Liberalism. Philosophy and 
Public Issues 2 (2): 7-15.
Kitcher, P. 2011. Science in a Democratic Society. Amherst: Prometheus Books.
Krugman, P. 2007. Th e Conscience of a Liberal. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.
Lehrer K. and C. Wagner. 1981. Rational Consensus in Science and Society. Dordrecht: Reidel 
Publishing Company.
Lister, A. 2010. Public Justifi cation and the Limits of State Action. Philosophy, Politics and 
Economics 9 (2): 151-175.
Lister, A. 2013. Th e classical tilt of justifi catory liberalism. European Journal of Political Th eory 
12 (3): 316-326.
Mack, E. 2011. For a New Liberalism. CATO Unbound. Accessed April 8, 2013. http://www.
cato-unbound.org/2011/10/10/gerald-gaus/range-justice-or-how-retrieve-liberal-
sectual-tolerance
Mill, J.S. 1848/1965. Principles of Political Economy. Part I. In Collected Works of J.S. Mill, Vol. 
II., ed. J.M. Robson. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Mill, J.S. 1859/1977. On Liberty. In Collected Works of J.S. Mill, Vol. XVIII., ed. J.M. Robson.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 213-310.
Moon, A. 2001. Blog on Th e Order of Public Reason. Accessed February 10, 2012. http://
publicreason.net/2011/02/28/opr-iv13-the-reasons-one-has/ 
Oxfam. 2013. Th e cost of inequality: how wealth and income extremes hurt us all, Oxfam Media 
Briefi ng, 18 January 2013, Ref: 02/2013. Accessed February 5, 2013. http://www.
oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/fi les/cost-of-inequality-oxfam-mb180113.pdf 
Quong, J. 2011. Liberalism without Perfection. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Quong, J. forthcoming. What Is the Point of Public Reason? Philosophical Studies.
Rawls, J. 1993/1996. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.
Elvio Baccarini | Having a reason and distributive justice in Th e order of public reason
51
Rossi, E. forthcoming. Legitimacy, Democracy and Public Justifi cation: Rawls’ Political 
Liberalism vs Gaus’ Justifi catory Liberalism (November 10, 2012). Res Publica. Accessed 
May 15, 2013.  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2232789
UNCTAD. 2012a. Trade and Development Report 2012. Overview, New York and 
Geneva, 2012. Accessed January 7, 2013 http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/
tdr2012overview_en.pdf
UNCTAD. 2012b. Trade and Development Report, 2012. Policies for Inclusive and Balanced 
Growth, Geneva and New York. Accessed January 7, 2013 http://unctad.org/en/
PublicationsLibrary/tdr2012_en.pdf
Wall, S. 2010. On Justifi catory Liberalism. Philosophy, Politics and Economics 9 (2): 123-149.
Wolff , J. 2011. Ethics and Public Policy. London: Routledge.
Received: June 6, 2013
Accepted: July 3, 2013
Th e Department of Philosophy
University of Rijeka
Sveucilisna avenija 4, 51000 Rijeka
Croatia
ebaccarini@ff ri.hr
EuJAP | Vol. 9 | No. 1 | 2013
